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Abstract: Argumentation schemes describe patterns of reasoning in discourse. We report an 
investigation into whether the argumentation scheme known as ‘inference to the best 
explanation’ (IBE) captures the argumentation found in collaborative case-based learning. We 
examine the dialogue of three students working in an online learning environment as they 
attempt to explain the verdict in a legal case of medical negligence; the IDE scheme is clearly 
visible in the dialogue. We also report the exploratory development of shared argument 
diagramming tools that allow learners to draw their explanations while they discuss them. The 
tools passively reinforce the IBE argumentation scheme. Evaluation of the tools provided the 
clearest evidence to date that learners are able to integrate their shared online argument 
diagramming with their computer-mediated dialogue.   
Argumentation schemes and case-based collaborative learning  
Case-based learning is arguably the archetypal praxis for computer supported collaborative learning. Cases are 
representations of complex situations that call for explanation, analysis or resolution. The set of facts describing 
a situation will often be loosely structured, incomplete, and of varying reliability; several alternative 
explanations or solutions are usually possible. The case material discussed in this paper has all of these 
characteristics. It is an account of a law suit against a physician accused of negligence; a group of students 
struggles to explain the reasons for the judge’s verdict in the case as part of their learning about medical law in 
professional practice. This making sense collectively of the facts of the case is characteristic of case based 
collaborative learning, and is increasingly regarded as a programmatic description of CSCL (Stahl, Koschmann 
& Suthers, 2006) 
Learning through collaborative inquiry and explanation is an essentially inter-subjective phenomenon 
arising in the interactions between learners (Suthers, 2005; Suthers, Medina, Vatrapu, Dwyer, 2007). We should 
then regard the group of learners as a single cognitive system jointly constructing an explanation that resides in 
the semantic core of their discourse. More accurately, they may develop several competing explanations or 
converge progressively on a single explanation. Through their discussion, learners fit the facts within a structure 
that provides the relationships between those facts and abstracts their central meaning, rendering directly the 
explanation for the case (Tscholl and Dowell, 2008a). Individual learners possess distinct domain knowledge 
that is modified differentially by the collaborative development of explanations (Tscholl and Dowell, 2008b). 
Critical argumentation is an analytical prism through which to view this process of meaning making in 
case-based collaborative learning. Its focus is the set of propositions in a discourse as a representation of the 
reasoning of the participants. It typically applies to dialectical situations where alternative conclusions are 
possible, but it is not limited to adversarial dialogues or disagreements. Occasionally, research is reported that 
finds that some particular dialogue or other contained few arguments, as indexed by the challenge or rebuttal 
moves it contains. However this is to use a lay notion of argument, rather than the sense of arguments and 
argumentation that we are concerned with here. Both the content of reasoning dialogues, and the rhetorical 
forms of those dialogues are the concern in critical argumentation.  
People are adept at discourse as a process and no less so in a collaborative learning situation. They 
challenge and concede appropriately taking account of the structure of the discourse, turn taking, and previous 
contributions (Kuhn, Shaw & Felton, 1997; Resnick et al 1993). When their communication is computer 
mediated and textual, those skills are arguably even more vital to sustaining a dialogue. But in contrast with 
their discursive skills, the arguments learners construct, particularly when using evidence, can be relatively 
inadequate (Schwarz & Glassner, 2003). Those arguments may rely on non-justified beliefs rather than 
articulated reasons or theory, they often consist of detached reasons and may give no recognition of alternatives 
or rebuttal of counter-arguments (Kuhn, 1991). People frequently accept the plausibility of explanations without 
paying sufficient attention to their consistency with the available evidence (Brem & Rips, 2000; Weinberger et 
al, 2006). These observations about the weakness of reasoning with evidence apply to both everyday and expert 
domains, as studies of jurors’ reasoning (Carlson & Russo, 2001) have clearly shown. 
Critical argumentation attempts to understand the form and success of argumentation in discourse. It 
defines a typology of discourse types by relating them to the purposes of the discourse, the knowledge that the 
participants possess and come to possess in the discourse, and the methods they use. At a lower grain of 
 analysis, critical argumentation concerns the form of arguments within distinct episodes in a discourse. It makes 
the important assumption that discourse contains stereotypical forms of reasoning or argumentation schemes.  
Argumentation schemes describe how discourse advances from one set of propositions to another, analogous to 
the advance from premises to conclusions in formal logic. They characterize the kinds of arguments typical of 
everyday conversation, arguments that subsequently can be overturned but that nevertheless provide useful 
heuristics for advancing understanding, particularly when information may be uncertain, unreliable or 
incomplete. 
Many common kinds of argumentation schemes have been described; some 25 schemes are discussed 
in (Walton, 1996). For example, one of the most frequently cited schemes describes how expert opinion is 
incorporated into an argument: if a known expert asserts that some statement in their field of expertise is correct, 
then that statement should be regarded as correct. Argumentation schemes are useful for recognizing kinds of 
arguments, for recognizing the parts of arguments that are missing – such as the premises that people leave 
implicit, and they offer a basis for evaluating arguments. They have also been used for structuring interactions 
in multi-agent systems in artificial intelligence (Reed & Walton, 2005). Associated with each kind of 
argumentation scheme is a set of critical questions to test arguments corresponding with the scheme. For 
example, one of the critical questions attached to the expert opinion scheme concerns consistency: do other 
experts agree that the statement is correct?  
We can therefore speculate that case based collaborative learning is also associated with a particular 
argumentation scheme, and a strong candidate for it is ‘inference to the best explanation’ (IBE). This scheme 
applies to situations where an explanation needs to be formed and where alternative explanations are possible. 
IBE embodies a kind of reasoning that is abductive (Walton, 2005), sometimes also called retroductive,  
concerned with finding the most probable explanation for some observed event or object, in terms of the 
preceding conditions that caused it. Josephson and Josephson (1996) argued that much reasoning in ordinary 
life, and in science, medicine and law is of this kind; they contemplate whether abduction and planning are the 
primary functions of cognition. 
Abductive reasoning, in contrast with formal deductive reasoning, is intrinsically creative, transforming 
partial knowledge into more complete and general knowledge. That knowledge must be tentative, rather than 
certain, given that it involves reasoning from consequent to antecedent.  Peirce described abductive reasoning as 
"the only kind of reasoning which supplies new ideas, the only kind which is, in this sense, synthetic" (Peirce, 
1997). Abductive reasoning therefore holds considerable promise as an account of how learning arises from 
explanation and problem solving. Abductive reasoning gets its name from the way in which explanations are 
lead by the data. Typically, an observation is made that is unexpected or requires explaining for some other 
reason; we recognize a hypothesis that explains the observation better than any other so we tentatively adopt it 
as our explanation. 
Walton emphasizes the discursive context of IBE where explanation is driven by the need to find 
answers to successive questions:  
" The best explanation is one that increases the understanding of a questioner as that individual moves 
forward through a search process. Of course, what increases understanding depends on the nature of 
the investigation... An abductive argument that is put forward by a proponent and meets the 
requirements for the scheme is to be evaluated in a given case with respect to how a respondent's 
critical questions are answered in a dialogue" (Walton, 2005, p. 206).  
IBE should then be regarded as a process as much as a conclusion and at a larger scale than that of 
individual inferences. As a process on a larger scale, the IBE argumentation scheme describes the dialogue’s  
lifecycle, extending from the dialogue setting, and formation of explanation attempts, through to the evaluation 
of explanations, and dialogue closure (Walton, 2005). A set of critical questions is associated with the 
evaluation phase: How adequate is the explanation relative to the alternatives? Have all the alternatives been 
found? How adequate is the explanation in itself for accounting for the given facts? How reliable are those 
facts?  
To examine our assumption that IBE is the default argumentation scheme for case based collaborative 
reasoning, we will examine the dialogue taken from such a learning situation created in our research labs.  
An observation of collaborative learning through explaining a case of medical 
negligence 
We developed a case-based learning activity in medical law for undergraduate students taking a taught module 
on professional issues for clinicians. The setting for this learning activity was a collaborative learning 
environment constructed for the purpose. The environment provided shared access to a library of case materials, 
a synchronous chat system, and a shared note taking area. The students had already attended a lecture on the law 
of medical negligence and the learning experience we designed for our study substituted for the planned class 
work that would have involved a similar face-to-face discussion of cases. The learning experience we designed 
 was focused on a case in which a general practitioner had been accused of negligence that it was claimed 
resulted in a patient suffering a stroke. We adapted the case for our purposes (Figure 1) from (Goldberg, 2000) 
to target the key issues of negligence: (i) whether the doctor’s actions breached their duty of care to the patient, 
and (ii) whether actual harm was caused by a breach of duty of care. The relationship between these issues is 
potentially complex, and different qualities and forms of causation are possible. It is possible, for example, for a 
person to breach their duty of care, and therefore to be negligent, but for them not to be found liable for some 
harm that occurs because there were more significant factors involved more directly in causing the harm, 
because the harm was likely to have occurred regardless of the doctor’s actions, etc. Hence the job of a court of 
law is to decide whether a person has been the victim of a negligent action and deserves compensation; 
disciplining a professional who has been negligent is the job of employers and professional bodies. 
 
A 22-year old asian woman presented herself 3 times within a year at her General 
Practitioner’s practice, with the intention of starting contraception before her marriage. She 
was to be married on 30th of November and was eager to start the contraception. She was 
warned that there were health risks associated with contraceptive pills. On the third visit, on 
11th of October, her blood pressure (BP) was taken and it was at 150/100 (higher than normal 
for a woman of her age). This high reading was taken by the GP (Dr. Shaw) as a symptom of 
‘white-coat hypertension’ - anxiety caused by being in a doctor’s presence which can, 
however, be indicative of a general tendency to hypertension. The next day she started the 
pill. She claims that within 3 weeks she returned to the GP complaining about headaches and 
feeling generally ill. She says the GP prescribed a medication for the headache. The GP 
claims this meeting did not take place and records of any meetings that occurred during this 
period were no longer available. A week later, the plaintiff was admitted to hospital suffering 
from numbness and difficulty in walking. Her blood pressure was read several times and was 
variously found to be at 170/110, 110/60 and 140/110. She was diagnosed as having suffered 
a stroke. 
 
Note: the statistical evidence does not link taking contraceptives with stroke, over the 
population as a whole. 
 
Figure 1. Description of the Vadera vs Shaw case 
 
A group of three undergraduate medical students participated in this case-based learning experience. 
The students were presented with the description of the ‘Vadera vs Shaw’ case and were asked to explain the 
judge’s verdict of ‘negligent but not liable’. The students approach this task by giving their opinion of the 
doctor’s negligence; they don’t refer directly to the judge at all. An extract from their dialogue is reproduced in 
Figure 2 and includes the timestamp of each contribution. The order of a small number of contributions (those 
where the {timestamp} is enclosed in curly brackets) has been changed to make clearer what appears to be the 
intended sequence of exchanges, disrupted by time-ordered, post-once chat system.  
Evidence for the IBE argumentation scheme in the dialogue 
The argumentation of this group has the characteristics of both inquiry and persuasion (Dowell and Asgari-
Targhi, 2008). But can the IBE argumentation scheme be recognized in the dialogue as a structure 
encompassing the contributions of the three learners and characterising the movement in the dialogue? 
The students can be seen to move from one tentative view to another as they try to make sense of the 
case in relation to their understanding of the law of medical negligence. The first hypothesis they advance 
suggests that the general practitioner was careless but not negligent (14:23:45), considering the fact that the GP 
ignored the unusually high blood pressure reading. When additional facts are then considered this hypothesis 
becomes less sustainable, for example, the new fact introduced by the students themselves that the normal 
protocol would have been to take additional readings of blood pressure. There is now a tentative and somewhat 
tacit agreement that the GP was negligent (14:26:41). Up to this point the learners were focused on whether or 
not the doctor’s actions were negligent, or whether they were only careless (a careless act will not necessarily be 
negligent). The dialogue then considers the additional hypothesis about “the not liable part” of the verdict 
(14:27:35). The first fact selected in relation to this hypothesis concerns the disputed consultation at which the 
GP is alleged to have ignored contra-indications to the prescription. David claims that this fact alone should 
decide the GP’s liability. Gemma finally suggests a new hypothesis – that the case turns on what would have 
happened if the GP had not made the original prescription. This is a clear rejection of David’s hypothesis and 
decisively re-frames the issue of the causal relationship between the doctor’s actions and the actual harm 
suffered by the patient, which precisely applies the concept of liability. The students then look for other facts to 
 confirm this counter-factual hypothesis and in doing so incorrectly interpret the statistical evidence: within the 
sub-population of hypertensives there is likely to be a significant correlation between strokes and the 
contraceptive pill which would then sanction the opposite hypothesis - that the GP was liable. 
 
14:23:40 Gemma: What do u think about it 
david? 
14:23:45 David: maybe the GP was a bit naive 
with teh white coat business 
14:23:56 David: i mean 150/100? 
14:24:05 Gemma: so u would think that she is 
liable? 
14:24:28 David: i would tend to say no 
14:24:39 David: but I  am evidently wrong 
here 
14:24:55 Gemma: i don't think I'm 
understanding u? 
14:25:14 Gemma: which part of the verdict 
would u tend to disagree with? 
14:25:35 David: well, i think the GP was 
maybe a little naive to say that such a high BP 
was white coat hypertension 
{14:25:55} Gemma : Yep i think i could agree 
with u there... 
14:25:46 David: but i think it was a fair 
diagnosis 
14:26:11 Gemma: so u think she was right in 
prescribing the pill anyway? 
14:26:18 Hywel: shouldn't he have repeated 
the test again at another time 
14:26:21 David: Potentially 
14:26:28 Gemma: Yeh thats what i though 
14:26:37: David: maybe she would have been 
better off taking repeated BP's, maybe at 
home? 
{14:26:51}: David: somewhere where the 
element of the doctors presence was reduced 
14:26:41 Hywel: so he  was negligent- he 
behaved irresponsibly 
14:26:59 David: Or did he? 
 
{14:26:40 Gemma: And we don't know what 
kind of history the GP took  
14:27:08 David: True 
14:27:12 Hywel: i agree 
14:27:35 Hywel: what about the not libale 
part? 
14:27:42 David: I think that the crux here is 
whether the second meeting took place 
14:28:01  Gemma: Yeh 
{14:28:11} David: if it did, and the GP fobbed 
her off, then definate case for negligance, not 
having followed up the symptoms etc. 
{14:28:36} David: but, if not then the GP 
wasnt to know about any adverse affects 
experienced 
14:28:08: Hywel: what responsibility does the 
doctor have for keeping the records safe? 
14:28:30 Gemma: yeh what about at the 
pharmacy, wouldn't there be a record of the 
prescription there? 
14:29:26 Gemma: really the question is, 
would she have suffered the stroke if she 
hadn't been on the pill? 
{14:29:33} David: Indeed 
{14:29:41} Hywel: apparently not- 
statistically anyway 
……. 
14:31:21 David: so are we suggesting that 
the GP was not guilty of breach of duty? 
14:31:24 Hywel: so if he took the same 
action as any other doctor would have (which 
the facts show that he did) he is not liable 
14:31:40 Gemma: i say that because of the 
lack of statistical evidence linking the pill 
with stroke that the verdict is justified 
14:31:40 David: Agreed 
14:31:48 Hywel: Agreed 
 
Figure 2. CMC group dialogue extract 
 
In the students’ dialogue the four critical questions appear implicitly: alternative explanations for 
different conclusions about Dr Shaw’s negligence and liability are advanced and compared; each explanation is 
assessed to at least some degree against the case facts. The reliability of the facts is considered certainly in terms 
of their completeness. The students definitively conclude that the GP was not liable, although they identify just 
one fact as relevant to this hypothesis and they only identify part of the explanation connecting the relevant facts 
to this hypothesis.  
 The students then have grasped the abstract distinction between negligence and liability but their use of 
it within the Vadera case is weak. David asserts that the key issue in deciding the GP’s liability was whether Dr 
Shaw had ignored contra-indications to the prescription at a follow-on consultation. David appears to make 
several false assumptions here: that the GP could not be negligent for the original prescription; that negligence 
refers to acts of omission and not of commission; and that liability can be decided by reference to the doctor’s 
actions without reference to whether those actions caused harm. Gemma then moves the discussion on to 
establish the counter-factual argument that will decide the matter. David acknowledges immediately the 
correctness of Gemma’s argument as the central issue in deciding the GP’s liability and abandons his own 
argument. David is learning to operationalise his concept of liability through the interaction. 
This acquisition of new knowledge about medical negligence appears to be shaped by the IBE 
argumentation scheme. A tentative hypothesis is abandoned as new facts are considered, and a new hypothesis 
is tentatively accepted. As one hypothesis succeeds another, the conceptual differences underlying those 
hypotheses are exposed to each learner, modifying the knowledge each possesses about this domain (Tscholl & 
Dowell, 2008a). The naïve concept of ‘being to blame’ comes to be replaced by the distinct concepts of ‘being 
negligent’ and ‘being liable’. However the students’ ability to interpret the concepts for the particular facts of 
the Vadera case remains weak.  
The IBE scheme characterizes the argumentation of the three students and is useful in interpreting the 
learning outcomes of the dialogue. Discussion of the Vadera case by a different group, and that groups’ 
discussion of a different case of medical negligence, are examined in Tscholl & Dowell (2008b); again the 
dialogues can be seen to exhibit the IBE argumentation scheme which may well be characteristic of case-based 
collaborative learning. We now report the exploratory development of a collaborative case-based learning 
environment that supported shared argument diagramming with prompting of the IBE argumentation scheme. 
Online collaborative argument diagramming 
Graphical knowledge mapping tools are a common feature of learning environments designed for knowledge 
building in general and inquiry and explanation construction in particular. The list of celebrated exemplar 
systems includes Belvedere, CSILE, and SenseMaker (Suthers, 2003). These systems exploit a limited variety 
of representations, such as block and arrow graphs and structured lists for recording and analysing observations, 
hypotheses, backgrounder sources and evidential relations. These representations are accepted as encouraging 
more thorough inquiry, extended reflection, and more lucid reasoning. The learning value of knowledge 
mapping tools has been repeatedly demonstrated (see Kirschner et al, 2003); learners using the CSILE system 
were reported to “greatly surpass students in ordinary classrooms on measures of depth of learning and 
reflection, awareness of what they have learned or need to learn, and understanding of learning itself“ 
(Scardamalia and Bereiter, 1994).  
Collaborative argument diagramming provides one of the most intriguing and challenging prospects for 
computer supported collaborative learning environments. Such systems are those that enable a group of learners, 
each with their own interface, to collaboratively draw their reasoning during their discussion using synchronous 
groupware capabilities. Belvedere is amongst the best known of argument diagramming systems and has been 
examined in an online configuration, taking the original single user application program with graphing tools and 
source document browser/reader and augmenting them with a simple chat facility for synchronous text-based 
communication (Suthers 2003). Evaluations of the system with pairs of learners were comparative with the 
original face-to-face variant and focused on the influence of the argument graphs on the effectiveness of the 
collaboration.  
Suther’s studies provided unequivocal evidence that the argument diagrams play a greater role in the 
online collaboration condition; the online learners engaged in significantly more drawing activity and 
significantly less verbal communication activity. The greater focus on the diagram produced an increased 
presence in the dialogue of concepts that the software enforced, specifically on the relationships between 
individual facts and the categorization of statements as evidence or hypotheses. As the graph became a greater 
focus of the interactions between learners, new ideas were introduced directly into the diagram without first 
being shared verbally (an effect that could alternatively be interpreted as a breaking down of the collaboration). 
Suthers describes the chat transcripts as containing many examples of poorly coordinated activity, and in 
particular, disconnects between the activity in the workspace and the verbal activity in the chat.  
 A number of other efforts to assess online collaborative argument diagramming have been reported. A 
comparison of the online Belvedere system and the generic group meeting/authoring environment NetMeeting 
(available with earlier versions of Microsoft Windows) reported that the Belvedere dialogues were more 
conceptually oriented, though the results were confounded by the learners’ difficulty in understanding the 
learning content (Veerman et al. 1999). Other studies with shared argument diagramming tools and synchronous 
communication facilities have  reported that learners experienced difficulty with using the argument 
diagramming tools in combination with maintaining a dialogue; a comparison group working with the chat 
alone produced more successful arguments and achieved better learning outcomes (Baker, 2003; Baker et al. 
 2003). Other recent reports of online collaborative argument diagramming have also described a system where a 
synchronous chat facility was provided separately from the argument diagramming tool (Munneke et al. 2007). 
The students were asked to debate an issue of ethics in relation to genetic technology and a comparison was 
made of the use of the shared argument diagramming system with a group text editor for composing summaries 
of the debate. The data appear to show that the diagrams supported a more satisfactory analysis but the dialogue 
between the students showed no benefit of the diagram. 
There is in most of this work a consistent absence of a strong beneficial effect of the argument 
diagramming, with the possible exception of some of the effects found by Suthers. The absence of a stronger 
effect is puzzling and seems likely to be confounded by interface design factors as much as by collaboration or 
learning process factors. A particular feature of all the systems is the independence of the drawing and ‘talking’ 
facilities in the interfaces, which is experienced as a lack of integration by the learners: simply, they struggle to 
maintain a dialogue with the chat tool and managing a collaborative drawing activity in parallel only serves to 
make this harder.   
What is needed then is a better integration of argument diagramming and verbal discourse. It is at this 
point that we return to the question of argumentation schemes. If, as we proposed earlier, there is a characteristic 
argumentation scheme for collaborative case-based learning, then that scheme characterizes both the dialogues 
and the contents of the argument diagrams. If this scheme can be introduced into the user interface then it has 
the potential as a vehicle for integrating the chat and the drawing tool. The Araucaria argument diagramming 
tool (Reed and Rowe, 2004) is an exemplar of how argumentation schemes may be used to support users in 
building argument diagrams, although it is neither a collaborative online tool, nor is it designed or used for 
learning. It is possible then that use of specific argumentation schemes could be reinforced in an online 
collaborative argument diagramming system to encourage a better integration of discussion with argument 
diagramming. We now describe our exploratory build of such a system in which the IBE argumentation scheme 
is reinforced.  
Reinforcement of the IBE argumentation scheme in collaborative argument 
diagramming online 
The  COALA system (Cooperative Argumentation and Learning application) provides a shared diagramming 
tool, a chat facility for synchronous communication  and a browsable library of case materials  (Dowell and 
Gladisch, 2007)*. The argument diagramming tool uses a notation similar to Belvedere consisting of two node 
types. Data nodes contain facts and given information of the learning material or external sources, hypothesis 
nodes hold assumptions or conclusions that have been made by the users. The nodes can be linked to each other 
with different types of connections. These can either support or refute arguments. Furthermore, these 
connections can be annotated by the users to show specific criteria defining the connection. This typing of links 
is similar to the evaluation modifiers of Araucaria (Reed and Rowe, 2004), but allows for a more flexible 
arrangement of arguments in the diagramming area, since all nodes can be arranged freely and a single node can 
support and refute multiple nodes at once.  
The diagram can only be modified by one user at a time and the annotator role can be requested and 
passed by and to any user. The annotator chooses how often to re-fresh their drawing to the rest of the group 
using a synchronise function, hence their drawing activity is not visible second by second by the other learners. 
COALA provides cut and paste from the case library and chat window into the contents of the diagram, to place 
quotations directly into the nodes of the diagram. Nodes can be flexibly re-positioned in the diagram and their 
links automatically re-drawn. 
The screen shot of COALA in Figure 3 shows the case library, chat window containing the discussion 
between the users, and the argument diagram which is partially complete. The case material shown is again the 
Vadera vs Shaw case given to the group in the first study who used the simple online collaborative learning 
environment. The argument diagram consists of uniquely numbered data nodes (D) and hypothesis nodes (H) 
linked by support relationships (single arrowhead) or refutation relationships (double-opposed arrowhead, the 
bold arrow indicating direction). 
COALA attempts to integrate the diagramming and discussion activities through reinforcement of the 
IBE argumentation scheme. The reinforcement is provided by two features: the scheme checker, and the 
question asker, both contained in the scheme tool palette (shown in Figure 4). The palette is usually hidden from 
view and the user can make it visible using the controls in the window bar. The question asker reminds the 
learners of the critical questions that need to be asked of any argument corresponding with the IBE scheme. 
There are 4 such questions and the question asker feature allows learners to select one question and quote it 
directly in the chat system where it can be modified before sending. The scheme checker provides limited 
feedback on the conformance of the diagram syntactically with then IBE argumentation scheme, for example it 
advises users to consider additional hypotheses if appropriate.  
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3. The  COALA user interface 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The argumentation scheme tool 
 
In an evaluation of COALA with 4 groups of 3 users, a good level of consistency between the 
dialogues and diagrams was found (Dowell and Gladisch, 2007). The number of hypotheses introduced into the 
dialogues was consistent with the number of hypotheses appearing in the diagrams; similarly, the number of 
facts considered in the dialogues and the number appearing in the diagrams was also consistent. In post-session 
questionnaires, the learners indicated that the diagrams and dialogues were well integrated: the diagrams were 
broadly seen to be a fair or good representation of what had been discussed; the learners felt that with more 
practice with the tools they could produce even better diagrams. These results are in striking contrast to the 
reports of fracturing between dialogue and diagramming with previous online collaborative diagramming 
(Baker, Quignard et al. 2003; Suthers 2003 ).  
However the results cannot be attributed to the reinforcement of the argumentation scheme tool. The 
learners in the evaluation (Dowell and Gladisch, 2007) made no explicit use of the tool for quoting the critical 
 questions to the chat system, and the questions were not systematically visible in the dialogues either. In their 
questionnaire responses the users made clear that the critical questions were not useful. Three of the groups used 
the diagram checking tool to check their completed diagrams, although this did not prompt further modification 
of the diagrams.  
The better integration of dialogue and diagram found in our study is most likely due to the direct 
manipulation features of the user interface, in particular, the facility for cutting and pasting text from the chat 
window and the case materials window into the diagram; this was well used by the learners and clearly helped 
them to integrate their discussion and diagramming. Simply making the system easier to use allowed the 
learners to devote more attention to the discussion and the task. Making the process of constructing the 
diagrams easier is unlikely to result in less thoughtful content in the diagrams, since the diagrams are created 
collectively. The integration of diagramming and discussion may have been affected by our choice of learning 
domain; medical negligence cases may be more amenable to diagramming than the learning cases given to 
learners in other studies that include pathogenetic explanations and ethical dilemmas. 
The argumentation scheme tool was discretionary and limited, offering advice only to those users who 
sought it, and it may be that with re-design the tool would be better used. But we can also conjecture that a more 
active deployment of the argumentation scheme into the diagramming tool is needed to make the reinforcement 
felt. Suthers found that the presence of the argument diagramming encouraged his learners to refer to the 
concepts of the argument diagram representation, such as the relationships between the different pieces of 
evidence. A graphical representation of the argumentation scheme used as a framework or template in the 
argument diagramming tool would be likely to also encourage dialogue about the elements of the scheme, such 
as the adequacy of alternative hypotheses.  
The development of COALA demonstrated convincingly that groups of online learners can diagram 
their arguments during collaborative case-based learning. The prior studies have elicited the argumentation 
scheme that characterizes such discussions. These findings are the correct basis on which to continue to explore 
ways of explicitly and actively reinforcing the argumentation scheme to facilitate argumentation in online 
collaborative learning environments. 
 
 *COALA is available freely via http://coala.gladisch.org/ 
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